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Abstract 
 
This paper is to provide literature review on traditional financial system classification and offer 
and alternative classification of financial systems. Conventional wisdom holds that there are 
basically 2 types of financial systems – bank-based and market-based. But modern research 
points to the fact that such opinion may be quite biased. We consider several functions of 
financial system (not only financing, but corporate governance and information dissemination) 
and construct a database of financial metrics and institutional variables is order to conduct 
cluster-analysis. Our findings include: dichotomy does not hold; institutional environment is a 
key driver of financial system development; commodity exporters have inadequately low 
institutional development level.  
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1 This is merely a draft working paper, if you have any ideas to discuss or remarks to make please do not hesitate to 
contact me. My e-mail is snakers4@mail.ru. 
Introduction 
 
In the modern world changes occur much faster than in the beginning of the 
20th century, which has both negative and positive implications. Primarily it affects 
the real economy, e.g. consider recent informational revolution. But vast economic 
experience accumulated during 50 years of active economic research and recent 
crisis events point to the fact that economies are becoming more synchronized and 
fragile breeding more instability. Such prominent scholars as Hyman Minsky or 
Paul Davidson claim that the flaw lies at the very root of market economy, but in 
this case we will limit ourselves only to financial aspect of it. 
It’s common knowledge that the main function of financial system is 
transferring savings into investments. Allan, Gale (2000) paraphrase this 
definition:  financial system transfers funds from agents that have abundant funds 
to agents that require them.  Grosfield (1994) lists the main functions of financial 
system:  
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
Source: Alicia García Herrero, Javier Santillán Sonsoles Gallego, Lucía Cuadro and Carlos Egea, “LATIN 
AMERICAN FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN PERSPECTIVE” —  Banco de España 
 
 Covering liquidity gap; 
 Mobilizing and aggregating savings; 
 Allocation and investment of mobilized funds; 
 Decreasing and spreading risk; 
 Borrower monitoring (or decentralized system of collecting information 
in case of market financial systems); 
 System of corporate control. 
Main functions of FS 
1 Financing 2 Dissemination of 
information 
3 Corporate control 
So financial system (FS) does accumulation and spreading of funds as well 
as investment project risk monitoring. Doing this, it monitors performance of non-
financial companies.  
The umbrella task of classifying financial systems breaks down to several 
subtasks. We need to analyze and describe the existing methods of classification2, 
find out their pros and cons and eventually offer alternative classification, which 
considers flaws of conventional ones and includes our findings. 
Zingales and Rajan (2004) claim that the unprecedented process if financial 
globalization and liberalization is taking place since 1980 (it was somehow 
reversed by recent events though). It is quite probable that rapid development of 
financial sector together with financial deregulation all over the worlds will shape 
the global financial system. Conventional wisdom holds (with many exemptions 
that occurred recently, anyway such view usually dominates before major systemic 
crises happen) that FS of different countries tend to converge somehow which can 
shape economic policy3. Antzoulatos, Thanopoulos and Tsoumas (2011) also claim 
that in the economic literature there is some kind of consensus that market-based 
financial systems are superior to their banking counterparts. But can this 
fundamental premise have soft foundation? Block (2002) argues that traditional 
dichotomy (market systems vs. banking ones) can be put to probation as well. 
Historically banking systems and market systems were viewed as two 
separate models. The global financial system development trend is a big issue in 
the literature, but many scholars agree that nowadays many countries do not 
qualify for either of these models.  Lack of convergence and heterogeneity growth 
are to prove that. A significant number of countries will evolve from one model 
(say from banking model to market model) only if a large number of financial 
metrics (indices of financial depth, i.e. some financial system metrics divided by 
GDP) converge. When such convergence is not achievable or only some weak 
form is achievable we may expect that either clusters of homogenous countries 
                                               
2 Conventional classification is bank-oriented systems vs market systems. 
3 BIS and IMF are usually to be to blame for their unified approach.  
form or just heterogeneity increases.  Although presence of clusters increases 
entropy, it may provide some framework for more reliable economic policy. 
So cluster analysis, financial system classification and convergence analysis 
are different facets of global financial system. Low convergence implies lower 
probability of countries moving in one direction financially. It its turn it means that 
we can observe many different types of financial systems, which may have little in 
common. It obviously can be an obstacle to forming adequate policy for 
international entities. One reflection of such heterogeneity is debt crisis in Europe, 
where different countries were to be measured with one yardstick. Also there is no 
proper system of checks and balances which makes this uneven system even more 
unbalanced which lead to current crisis. Some studies (e.g. Antzoulatos, 
Thanopoulos and Tsoumas (2011), Veysov, Stolbov (2011) provide some evidence 
that the global financial system is experiencing only a limited form of convergence 
that cannot result in rapid development of underdeveloped countries. If we assume 
that countries do not converge to a single superior model, they may move to 
different directions within certain other models or clusters. 
To sum up, nowadays traditional dichotomy is becoming obsolete and we 
need to find a new way to describe and classify the diversity of modern financial 
landscape. Like many aspects of economics alternative classification may pursue 2 
purposes: 
 
 Academic; 
 Applied; 
 
Academic purpose implies making a contribution to the literature as many 
researchers claim that traditional approaches are outdated. Perhaps one of the 
reasons of fallibility of traditional approach is that is considers only the first 
function of the financial system, i.e. financing. To be more precise, if we take into 
consideration only a couple of variables (e.g. banking depth and stock market 
depth) we may miss the size of government sector or institutional development 
level. You may refer to Herrero, Gallego, Cuadro et.al. (2002) to view an example 
of cluster analysis employing a limited amount of variables.  
 From more applied point of view knowing which country refers to which 
type of financial system can facilitate right decision taking and prevent 
governments from conducting destructive reforms. If we find that there are several 
prevailing models of financial systems in the world, it may serve as a proof that 
successful policy conducted in one country can be adopted in another with same 
structure of financial system. On the other hand, major difference of one financial 
system from others may provide some caution in adopting other countries’ 
practices.  
 
 
Financial system structure as a basis of classification 
 
 This section describes traditional views on FS classification and is structured 
as follows. At first key institutional differences between bank-based and market-
based financial systems will be described.  Then we will describe brief history of 
each type of financial system. We will finish by providing some stylized statistical 
facts to support our analysis. Allan and Gales (2000) in their fundamental work 
provide basis for our analysis. 
 The most popular and well-know classification is to divide financial systems 
into bank- and market-based. At the root of this concept lies relative importance of 
banking and stock market institutions which can be measure by means of 
corresponding coefficients. Usually Germany, Japan, France are portrayed as bank-
based systems and the USA and the UK are portrayed as market-based.  Therefore 
sometimes bank-based are referred to as continental and market-based as Anglo-
Saxon. Figure xxx depicts stylized traditional view at FS classification. 
 The main agents of the FS are households and firms, who use services of 
banks, other intermediaries, insurance companies and stock and bond markets. 
 In ideal bank-based system the main role is played by banking institutions. 
Stock markets are relatively underdeveloped. Assets of households are to be 
allocated as claims on banks and insurance companies. The majority of companies 
are not listed, listed companies have very limited amount of major shareholders 
(banks are not uncommon among shareholders).  Therefore institutional investors 
play a minor role. Relations between financial intermediaries and companies have 
long-term nature and are based on mutual information sharing. Such relations 
decrease asymmetry of information and borrowing costs. Financial monitoring is 
conducted by banks, which monitor investment projects and intervene if necessary. 
Some researchers nevertheless claim that on a certain stage of development using 
own funds can be more efficient for firms.  
 In ideal market-based system market institutions are well-developed and 
households’ assets are allocated in the form of shares and bonds. Ownership 
structure is very diluted and there are no major shareholders. Institutional investors 
play a major role. Main ways of raising capital are IPOs and corporate paper. 
Monitoring is conducted by stock markets, special government entities and rating 
agencies. It has an immediate implication that market-based systems rely heavily 
on information quality and accounting transparency. Herrero, Gallego et.al. (2002) 
claim that institutional framework has major effect on market-based system 
performance. Levine (2002) states that banking institutions can play a pivotal role 
during early stages of economic development or in bad institutional environment.   
The next step is to evaluate comparative advantages and disadvantages of 
stylized types of financial systems. Usually the following features are discussed: 
competition vs. insurance, public information vs. private, external control vs. 
internal control, efficiency vs. stability. 
 
 Figure 2 
 
 
 
Source (adapted): Angelos A. Antzoulatos, John Thanopoulos, Chris Tsoumas, “Financial System Structure, 
Change and Convergence: Evidence from the O.E.C.D. Countries”, University of Piraeus 80 Karaoli & Dimitriou 
street Piraeus 18534, Greece. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Table 1 
 Main characteristics of Financial Systems  
    
 Criterion Market-based Bank-based 
1 Financial markets Substantial, liquid Small, less liquid 
2 % of listed companies High Low 
3 Risk dissemination Via market mechanisms, spatial Via banks, inter-temporal 
4 Ownership and control Dispersed Concentrated 
5 Corporate control change Frequent hostile acquisitions Rare hostile acquisitions 
6 Principal agent problem Shareholders vs. management 
Major vs. minor 
shareholders 
7 Bank role in external financing Low High 
8 Debt to equity Low High 
    
 
Source (adapted): Irena Grosfeld, “COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS PROBLEMS 
OF INFORMATION AND CONTROL IN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION” —  CASE 
Research Foundation, Warsaw 1994 
 
To begin with, market-based systems are more competitive and offer more 
favourable financing terms decreasing financial intermediaries’ profit. In bank-
based systems households’ assets are more stable as banks diversify their assets 
which cannot be done by households themselves. In this case so called inter-
temporal smoothing of risk and yield takes place. It reduces risk during turbulent 
periods at the cost of lower yield during prosperity periods. In market-based 
systems agents cannot avoid non-diversifiable market risk, which is inherent to the 
whole economy and forces to sell assets during crises at fire sale prices. But under 
modern circumstances the role of banking system during crises is vaguer.  
In this case stable financial intermediaries able to withstand financial 
turbulence and provide liquidity and fair price to assets play the stabilizing role.  In 
this case stable financial intermediaries able to withstand financial turbulence and 
provide liquidity and fair price to assets play the stabilizing role.  Davidson (2009) 
argues that the USA owed its success in overcoming previous mortgage crises to 
special purpose vehicles created by the government to stabilize the market. 
Nevertheless nowadays the problems of moral hazard put traditional advantages of 
stable banking system to test. It is worth noting that the most of international (and 
even local Russian) scandals are connected with the names of the biggest and most 
revered financial institutions.  
One of classic arguments for market-based systems is that they effectively 
disseminate information necessary for decision taking. Market systems are 
characterized by less concentrated structure of information, and diluted ownership 
gives a vast number of agents an incentive to conduct monitoring. These classic 
arguments should in ideal world imply that market systems are more advanced 
from informational standpoint. But in modern reality both systems face severe 
problems, free rider problem being the mildest one.  
If information is accounted for and disclosed by the markets, then why spend 
money and recourses on processing and storing it? Therefore Allan and Gale 
(2000) note that market-based economies tend to under invest into information. 
Also the problems of moral hazard, asymmetric information and vague accounting 
have come to play the first role during this crisis. Stiglitz (2003) asserts that 
increased corruption within top-management and rating agencies undermines the 
very heart of market-based financial system – its informational advantage. 
Financial intermediaries (although less efficient at small and very big scales) 
can internalize financial monitoring costs reducing information asymmetry. This 
requires redirection of recourses into creating monitoring framework. Its scaling 
can be quite costly as well. 
  It also important to consider how these two system types play their role in 
financing innovation. The study of connection between finance and innovation 
dates back to Schumpeter. Now researchers miss that these two types of systems 
specialize in gathering different types of information. Intermediaries decrease costs 
of processing vast arrays of information, but they cope poorly with uncertainty, 
innovation and new ideas. On the other hand the development of VC funds in 
Europe with active bank participation mitigates that problem. Banks are integrated 
there in creating and managing VC funds. Botazzi (2009) claims that banks 
participate in 44% of VC funds in Europe and their share on average is about 40%. 
In a nutshell, empirical studies say the following about impact of financial system 
of innovation: 
 
 Market based FS are suitable for financing break through innovation 
while bank-based are for incremental; 
 Now VC funds make differences between these systems more vague; 
 Developing markets should rely more and banking institutions due to 
poor institutional framework and ecosystem; 
 
Other disadvantage of market systems stems from the fact that their high 
efficiency is based on big and highly liquid financial institutions. To maintain 
efficient performance financial markets a priori require higher level of financial 
depth, i.e. high capitalization of stock market related to GDP. In other words entry 
barriers are quite high. Also in modern world on stock markets there is equivalent 
of bank reserve systems, so weak and inefficient stock markets can have disastrous 
consequences. Also “fixed” costs of establishing market-based system make such 
systems viable only after reaching some “critical mass”. Also it was noted that 
markets suffer from information asymmetry, moral hazard and so on. Bank-based 
systems have lower entry barriers and do not rely heavily on quality of 
information. Also banks can use markets to diversify risk, and markets themselves 
cannot avoid their non-diversifiable risk. Also recent experience show that market 
asset prices can wobble due to non-fundamental factors. It is also worth noting that 
competition from financial markets can lead to disintermediation, which in long-
term can result in higher risk and more fragile system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Table 2  
 
Pros and Cons of financial system types 
 
 США Великобритания  Япония Франция  Германия  
Financial markets      Financial intermediaries  
         
Competition      Insurance 
         
Efficiency      Stability 
         
Public information, free 
rider problem      
Private information, 
no free rider problem 
         
External control      Autonomy 
       
Source (adapted): Franklin Allen, Douglas Gale, “Comparing Financial Systems”, MIT Press, 2001, ISBN 
0262511258, с. 3. 
 
 Also the inefficiency and incompleteness of markets can be added to the 
aforementioned disadvantages of market systems. There is a big discussion in the 
literature on this topic, but for simplicity we may just assume that markets possess 
a weak form of efficiency. Also there is a new fractal theory of finance inspired by 
B. Mandelbrot (see for example Mandelbrot and Hudson (1996) or Calvet, Fischer, 
Mandelbrot (1997)). 
 Also in bank-based systems banks execute not only external but also internal 
monitoring. In Japan the system of main bank has developed, where shareholding 
bank can exert significant influence on decision taking. In Germany the same 
systems is called hausbank system. In market-based systems financial institutions 
can impact corporate governance using three methods: via proxy contest, M&A or 
hostile acquisition. But in reality only hostile acquisitions proved to be a working 
method of discipline among top-management.  
 It is also interesting to view brief history of FS development. Some historical 
patterns may be useful in creating alternative classification. 
 A vast number of different FS types existed throughout history in developed 
countries. It is important, that FS were shaped primarily due to financial instability 
periods and governments’ reaction to them. Due to political reasons in the USA the 
system of several big banks could not develop. Also due to political reasons in 
Germany stock market plays more limited role than in the UK or the USA. Also it 
is important that all types of systems were somewhat fragile and their development 
usually ended in systemic crises and regime switching. The government played and 
active role in switching the paradigm. Also history shows us that there were 
abundant examples of irrationality of financial markets, i.e. irrational exuberance 
or pessimism. It indicated that market-based systems both rely heavily on 
information quality and should be monitored by special government entities. Also 
it is worth noting that not only government can drive reforms, but usually they are 
initiated by it.  
 Also in emerging markets there is destructive understanding that 
development of FS equals full deregulation according to “Washington Consensus”. 
Historical analysis and empirical studies indicated that stock markets begin 
developing organically only given some level of financial sophistication in the 
country. Herrero, Gallego and Egea (2002) claim that hasty liberalization can have 
the following consequences: 
 
1. Increased competition leads to lower business margin and external 
shocks can be destructive for the system; 
2. Uncertainty and market risk rise in the short term; 
3. During transition period financial institutions can issue too many credits 
which makes them prone to crises; 
4. Lack of experience of regulators can have adverse consequences as well; 
 
Then we will present several statistical tables to illustrate ideas described 
above. Table xxx illustrates main macro metrics for biggest financial systems in 
the world. To begin with we should look at credit and bank asset depth which are 
proxies for relative bank importance in a country. Among these countries Japan is 
an obvious outlier because of exaggerated influence of government there. Also 
stock market is very developed in Japan and we cannot clearly say that it belongs 
to bank-based type. 
 Then if we look at Germany we will see that banks are more important there 
than stock markets. At the same time Germany’s banking depth is lower than that 
of the UK. In the UK banks and markets now are equally important. 
Also France that is supposed to be a conventional example of bank-based 
system is moving towards some average type. In France banks and markets are 
also relatively equal. In this case only the USA remain a book example of market 
system, where stock markets are more important than banks. But the American 
economy has one principal difference – bank credit to economy is higher due to 
high leverage. Also corporate bond market in the USA is the most developed 
across major countries.  
If we tackle government bond market, it’s almost equally developed in all 
countries except Japan, in which government has a significant influence on the 
economy.  
Also household fund allocation is another proxy of financial system type. 
Statistics indicates that conventional financial system types become more and more 
diluted nowadays as for example even Germany sees increased household 
ownership of stocks. 
          Table 3 
              
Household assets allocation, 1994 
              
Страна Cash or equivalents 
Home 
bonds 
Home 
stocks 
Foreign 
bonds 
Foreign 
stocks 
Loans and 
mortgages 
USA 19 27 36 1 9 3 
UK 24 10 39 2 13 1 
Japan 52 12 11 1 1 6 
France 38 30 13 3 3 2 
Germany 36 31 11 5 2 4 
              
 
              
Source:  Franklin Allen, Douglas Gale, “Comparing Financial Systems” —  MIT Press, 2001, ISBN 
0262511258, c. 51 
Also all studies discussing FS types usually tackle firm financing issue. It 
turns out that the most popular source of financing is retained earnings. 
Surprisingly enough, in the USA the major source is corporate paper, in the UK it 
is stocks. Japan and France are dominated by loans. 
 
  
Table 5 
Household asset allocation 
          
  
Cash and 
deposits 
Securites 
other than 
stock 
Loans Stock Insurance reserves Other 
2000 2007 2000 2007 2000 2007 2000 2007 2000 2007 2000 2007 
DE 35.2 35.5 6.5 7.3 0 02 28.2 25.1 28.9 31.3 1.3 0.9 
FR 33.4 29.4 2.9 1.6 0.8 0.7 29.6 26.7 29.9 37.8 3.5 3.8 
UK 20.8 26.6 1.8 0.5 0.2 0.1 23.3 15.7 51.2 53.7 2.7 3.4 
Источник:  Financial Assets and Liabilities of Households in the European Union, Eurostat, Statistics in 
focus, 32/2009 
European Union 
 
 
 
 
 
        Table 4 
Real sector financing sources, 1970-1985 
            
Indicator USA UK Japan France Germany 
Retained earnings 66.9 72 33.7 44.1 55.2 
Short-term bonds 1.4 2.3 N.A. 0 0 
Loans 23.1 21.4 40.7 41.5 21.1 
Commercial credit 8.4 2.8 18.3 4.7 2.2 
Bonds 9.7 0.8 3.1 2.3 0.7 
Stocks 0.8 4.9 3.5 10.6 2.1 
  
Source: Mayer, C. (1990), "Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development." In 
R. G. Hubbard (ed.),Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance and Investment (pp. 307332). 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
        Table  6 
Main macro metrics of major financial systems 
         
Country Year Central bank assets to GDP 
Private 
credit to 
GDP 
Bank 
deposits to 
GDP 
Banks 
assets to 
GDP 
Stock market 
cap to GDP 
Bond market 
cap to GDP  
Government bond 
market cap to 
GDP 
UK 2008 0.017 1.896 1.536 1.896 1.366 0.163 0.320 
UK 2005-2008 0.018 1.690 1.355 1.693 1.391 0.158 0.317 
Germany 2008 0.002 1.022 1.036 1.213 0.650 0.361 0.398 
Germany 2005-2008 0.002 1.066 1.003 1.295 0.539 0.347 0.402 
USA 2008 0.053 2.107 0.783 0.691 1.478 1.300 0.469 
USA 2005-2008 0.056 1.991 0.724 0.647 1.417 1.226 0.467 
France 2008 0.009 1.067 0.683 1.213 1.123 0.570 0.512 
France 2005-2008 0.006 0.972 0.675 1.138 0.967 0.470 0.518 
Japan 2008 0.123 0.949 1.831 1.509 1.023 0.379 1.657 
Japan 2005-2008 0.161 0.972 1.876 1.537 1.027 0.396 1.573 
         
Source: World Bank Financial structure database4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 Thortsen Beck and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, "Financial Institutions and Markets Across Countries and over Time: Data and Analysis" —  World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 4943, May 2009. 
Literature and database 
 
 As far as we are concerned, the literature on financial system cluster analysis 
is quite scarce. The most profound research on this topic was conducted by 
Antzoulatos, Thanoupolos and Tsoumas (2011), who employed 18 indicators from 
World Bank Financial Development Database to conduct cluster analysis. They 
analyze OECD countries using averages for 1994-2003. They use hierarchical 
agglomerative cluster analysis and simple Euclidian distance as a metric.  The set 
of variables is quite similar to our. Eventually they produce 5 clusters within 
OECD: 
1. Korea and the USA (market-based FS); 
2. Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland и Great Britain (both banks and 
markets are highly developed); 
3. Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal (bank-based 
type); 
4. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, 
Norway, Spain and Sweden (average level of development); 
5. Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia и Turkey (relatively 
less developed FS). 
 
We should note that Japan with high influence of government is one group 
with the UK, although it was said that central bank asset ratio is included in the set 
of variables. Taking only OECD into consideration implies automatic scope 
narrowing.  
Ruzaa and Juanb (2009) conducted quite similar analysis employing only 2 
indicators for OECD countries. It is obvious that if we want to develop an 
alternative classification for all countries, such methodology is inadequate. 
 
Also Herrero, Gallego and Egea (2002) conducted cluster-analysis for 55 
countries from Latin America. They employed only one financial metric, which is 
the sum of credits, stock market and bond market cap. The second indicator was 
PPP GDP. Such analysis does not consider institutional framework and efficiency 
of banking sector,  
We are going to use the following indicators in our analysis. 
 
 Table 7 
  
Code Variable list 
V1 Monetization ratio  (M2) 
V2 Liquid liabilities to GDP 
V3 Central bank assets to GDP 
V4 Private credit to GDP 
V5 Bank deposits to GDP 
V6 Bank assets to GDP  
V8 Life-insurance premium to GDP  
V9 Other insurance premium to GDP 
V10 Stock market cap to GDP 
V11 Bond market cap to GDP 
V12 Government bond market cap to GDP 
V13 Deposit  interest rate 
V14 Credit interest rate 
V15 Spread 
V16 Credit risk premium 
V17 Banking system capital ratio (WBFSD) 
V18 Non-performing loans to total credits 
V19 Banking system capital ratio (WDI) 
V20 Banking systems costs to revenue ratio 
V21 Bank ROA  
V22 Bank ROE 
V23 Concentration in banking system 
 
 All the indicators come from World Bank WDI or World Bank Financial 
Structure Databases. Dataset includes 180 countries. This amount will be limited 
during the procedure of cluster-analysis due to omissions of data. We also 
considered it beneficial to include several institutional indicators to catch 
intangible country ecosystem characteristics. 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Code Name 
IV6 Strength of legal rights index  
IV5 Depth of credit information index  
IV4 Ease of shareholder suits index  
IV3 Extent of disclosure index 
IV2 Monetary Freedom 
IV1 Financial Freedom 
 
 Institutional Variable 1 and 2 are calculated by The Heritage Foundation5. 
IV 3-6 are available in World Bank Doing Business Database. 
 Monetary freedom is combined index of monetary stability. Inflation and 
excessive price controls disrupt the mechanism of market economy. Monetary 
freedom is estimated using two factors: 
 
 Average inflation for 3 years; 
 Existence of price controls. 
 
Financial freedom is an estimate of efficiency of banking sector and 
independence of financial sector from government intervention. Government 
ownership of banks and other financial institutions usually lowers competition and 
quality of financial services. In ideal world independent central bank and 
regulators only conduct monitoring and intervene if necessary. Financial freedom 
index is constructed from following parts: 
 
 The degree of government regulation of financial service regulation; 
 The degree of government intervention into banking sector via direct or 
indirect ownership; 
 Level of development of financial markets; 
 Influence of government on credit issuance; 
 Openness for foreign competition. 
                                               
5 Methodology for the 10 Economic Freedoms. 
http://www.heritage.org/index/PDF/2011/Index2011_Methodology.pdf 
 Strength of legal rights index6 measures how bankruptcy and credit laws 
protect borrowers and therefore facilitate lending. It includes 8 components related 
to credit laws and 2 components related to bankruptcy laws.    
Credit information depth index measures quality of rules and laws regulating 
coverage, depth and availability of credit information. This index primarily 
measures quality of institutional environment for bank-based systems. 
Extent of disclosure index7 measures how fully public companies disclose 
their information. Market based systems’ performance is to depend on this 
variable. Ease of shareholders’ suits measures how easily shareholders can 
influence decision-taking within corporation via litigation. 
To sum up, 2 IV measure institutional environment in general, 2 measure 
key features of bank-based systems and 2 measure key features of market systems. 
Several a priori  judgments were used when choosing variables for cluster-
analysis: 
1. Some variables simply have too many omissions. Also stock market 
variables were given a valued 0, if the value was omitted This assumes 
that underdeveloped stock markets provide scarce statistics; 
2. Highly correlated variables were excluded as well; 
3. Insurance and bond market variables were left behind because of too 
many omissions as well; 
4. All IVs were included as they were calculated on consistent basis and 
had almost no omissions; 
 
All in all, we included the following variables: IV1-IV6, V1-V3, V5, V6, 
V10, V14, V19-V23. We calculated averages for 2000-2008 to mitigate some data 
omissions and inconsistencies.  
                                               
6 Methodology Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, “Private Credit in 129 Countries” – Journal of Financial 
Economics, May 2007. 
7 Djankov and others, “The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing” – Journal of Financial Economics, June 2008. 
Table 9 
Correlation matrix 
                             
  IV6 IV5 IV4 IV3 IV2 IV1 V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 V22 V23 
IV6 1.00                                 
IV5 0.18 1.00                            
IV4 0.47 0.26 1.00                           
IV3 0.06 0.27 -0.08 1.00                          
IV2 0.18 0.36 0.16 0.05 1.00                         
IV1 0.43 0.43 0.38 -0.13 0.59 1.00                       
V1 0.28 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.35 0.40 1.00                      
V2 0.38 0.16 0.22 -0.01 0.42 0.42 0.93 1.00                     
V3 -0.17 -0.12 -0.13 0.36 -0.16 -0.40 -0.12 -0.13 1.00                    
V4 0.49 0.44 0.35 0.09 0.51 0.58 0.63 0.69 -0.24 1.00                   
V5 0.42 0.17 0.24 0.08 0.41 0.45 0.92 0.99 -0.10 0.74 1.00                  
V6 0.26 0.34 0.06 0.81 0.24 0.11 0.38 0.35 0.29 0.52 0.47 1.00                 
V8 0.36 0.01 0.11 0.05 0.37 0.39 0.78 0.73 -0.15 0.57 0.72 0.23 1.00                
V9 0.12 0.25 -0.08 0.86 0.06 -0.07 0.15 0.06 0.58 0.23 0.17 0.91 0.20 1.00               
V10 0.30 0.17 0.12 0.02 0.35 0.38 0.54 0.69 -0.22 0.66 0.67 0.24 0.54 0.06 1.00              
V11 0.33 0.19 0.11 0.00 0.36 0.24 0.07 0.05 -0.09 0.57 0.08 0.19 0.07 0.16 0.14 1.00             
V12 -0.11 0.31 -0.33 0.94 -0.14 -0.44 -0.02 -0.16 0.87 -0.10 0.01 0.93 -0.05 0.93 -0.18 0.03 1.00            
V13 -0.07 -0.11 -0.15 0.03 -0.61 -0.29 -0.30 -0.40 0.27 -0.40 -0.38 -0.17 -0.37 -0.04 -0.19 -0.18 0.10 1.00           
V14 -0.12 -0.21 -0.15 -0.06 -0.52 -0.27 -0.30 -0.49 0.15 -0.55 -0.53 -0.39 -0.36 -0.21 -0.13 -0.14 -0.17 0.94 1.00          
V15 -0.09 -0.20 -0.12 -0.04 -0.47 -0.23 -0.26 -0.40 0.09 -0.48 -0.43 -0.33 -0.27 -0.16 -0.09 -0.13 -0.13 0.85 0.98 1.00         
V16 -0.10 -0.16 -0.15 0.03 -0.41 -0.25 -0.21 -0.26 0.25 -0.32 -0.28 -0.10 -0.23 0.02 -0.10 -0.06 0.10 0.90 0.95 0.95 1.00        
V17 0.01 -0.35 -0.05 -0.16 -0.25 -0.20 -0.30 -0.33 0.02 -0.43 -0.32 -0.35 -0.26 -0.28 -0.23 -0.15 -0.20 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.00 1.00       
V18 -0.15 -0.35 -0.09 -0.16 -0.24 -0.32 -0.28 -0.30 0.26 -0.49 -0.33 -0.34 -0.38 -0.25 -0.28 -0.35 -0.16 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.20 1.00      
V19 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.03 0.23 0.27 -0.04 -0.03 -0.31 0.48 -0.01 0.23 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.67 -0.09 -0.15 -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 -0.16 -0.31 1.00     
V20 -0.19 0.09 0.02 -0.34 0.07 0.18 -0.15 -0.13 -0.15 -0.16 -0.20 -0.38 -0.11 -0.33 -0.11 -0.10 -0.56 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.18 0.04 0.15 -0.01 1.00    
V21 0.13 -0.12 -0.03 0.31 -0.07 -0.12 -0.02 -0.02 0.22 0.00 0.02 0.28 0.06 0.30 0.01 0.04 0.79 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.32 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.41 1.00   
V22 0.12 -0.24 -0.10 0.33 -0.43 -0.25 -0.16 -0.21 0.38 -0.22 -0.14 0.26 -0.07 0.47 -0.12 -0.02 0.65 0.58 0.53 0.52 0.54 0.16 0.02 -0.20 -0.45 0.40 1.00  
V23 -0.14 -0.34 -0.18 -0.14 -0.02 -0.11 -0.25 -0.21 0.02 -0.14 -0.18 -0.09 -0.08 0.07 0.13 0.18 -0.12 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.09 0.01 -0.04 0.15 0.19 1.00 
Results 
 
We used standard cluster analysis approach –agglomerative method with 
simple Euclidian distance as proximity metric.  Dendrogram A refers to cluster 
analysis without using IVs. We derived the following conclusions from this 
analysis:  
 
1. FS are clearly divided into developed and underdeveloped systems; 
2. Such unique countries as Japan and Switzerland form separate clusters; 
3. USA forms a clear separate cluster within developed countries; 
4. Germany and Spain end up in the same final cluster. Also Canada the UK 
and the Netherlands end up in one final cluster. The same can be said 
about Scandinavian countries (one cluster)  and France and Italy (one 
cluster).  
5. Developing countries do not form clear clusters and their structure is very 
heterogenic. Clear clusters do not form until the very last iteration, which 
makes such analysis not entirely plausible and indicates that other 
approached should be used. 
    Table 10 
Average IVs for clusters obtained using IV cluster 
analysis 
       
Cluster IV6 IV5 IV4 IV3 IV2 IV1 
1 7.00 6.00 8.00 7.00 91.08 45.56 
2 8.00 5.00 4.00 0.00 88.32 84.44 
3 6.79 4.60 6.87 6.82 83.72 68.67 
4 5.55 4.44 6.59 4.16 75.98 59.49 
5 5.13 1.33 5.01 5.10 75.35 43.38 
6* 3.63 2.02 4.07 4.63 67.03 34.41 
RUS 3.00 2.00 7.00 6.00 58.77 32.22 
BRA 3.00 5.00 3.00 6.00 77.13 47.78 
VEN 2.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 55.82 41.11 
IDN 3.00 2.75 3.00 9.00 67.32 32.22 
IRN 4.00 3.00 0.00 5.00 60.20 10.00 
 
 Cluster analysis using IVs showed more sensible results. Situation 
drastically changed after employing 6 IV indicators. Dendrogram B appears to be 
more structured and to make more sense. We made the following conclusions from 
analyzing Dendrogram B: 
 
1) Financial system dichotomy is not observed. We assume that FS develop 
in the following way. Fist develops banking sector and institutional 
environment improves creating critical mass for development of markets. 
Therefore classic dichotomy does not hold anymore. Also cluster 3, 
which included mainly OECD countries, shows that average banking and 
market indicators are roughly of the same size. This is points to the fact 
banks and markets are complementary. 
2) We located 5 clusters in the end. Cluster 1 and 2 are Switzerland and 
Japan respectively with unique financial systems. Switzerland is so 
unique because both its banks and markets are exaggeratedly developed. 
Japan has very high government involvement in the financial system. 
Cluster 3 is formed mainly by developed OECD countries. Then clusters 
4 and 5 are formed by developing countries.    
3) Hypothesis that banks and markets are complementary is true; 
4) The USA is separate in cluster 3; 
5) The main principle of cluster forming is the quality of institutional 
environment. When it grows countries move from one group to another. 
6) We should pay special attention to a group of countries in “cluster 6”, i.e. 
countries that did not fit into other clusters and formed no clear structure. 
In this countries level of financial development is not adequately 
supported by institutional environment and therefore they fall out.  
7) “Cluster 6” includes Russia, Brazil, Uruguay, Venezuela and Iran, i.e. 
countries dependant on commodity exports and low development of 
institutions.   
 Conclusion 
 
We have systematized some modern literature contributions on financial 
system classification and conducted cluster analysis. Main conclusions are the 
following: 
 Traditional dichotomy is not applicable; 
 Key driver of financial system development is institutional environment; 
 There are actually 2 types of financial systems: developed and 
developing; 
 Japan, the USA and Switzerland are unique countries in terms of their 
financial systems; 
 Commodity exporters have inadequate development of institutional 
development which can hamper the development of their financial 
systems; 
Appendix 
 
 
                Table A1  
Financial development by clusters, average 2000-2008 
                   
Кластер V1 V3 V4 V5 V6 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V14 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 V22 V23 
1 2.13 0.16 1.17 1.97 1.68 0.0824 0.0222 0.84 0.435 1.29 1.85 4.24 3.96 0.56 0.71 0.000 0.002 0.405 
2 1.38 0.02 1.60 1.30 1.73 0.0680 0.0480 2.64 0.353 0.27 3.51 5.34 1.33 1.25 0.72 0.015 0.100 0.858 
3 0.92 0.03 1.05 0.76 1.05 0.0435 0.0282 0.92 0.476 0.39 7.82 7.33 4.43 1.33 0.65 0.012 0.107 0.716 
4 0.36 0.03 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.0086 0.0152 0.19 0.040 0.26 16.43 9.59 9.37 0.94 0.75 0.011 0.116 0.645 
5 0.30 0.05 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.0088 0.0102 0.17 0.013 0.29 18.36 13.60 9.69 0.80 0.59 0.020 0.176 0.763 
6* 0.34 0.12 0.19 0.29 0.27 0.0076 0.0149 0.14 0.049 0.27 23.25 11.67 9.81 0.62 0.65 0.020 0.207 0.733 
RUS 0.28 0.03 0.22 0.20 0.27 0.0034 0.0221 0.57  0.03 13.98 13.40 4.40 1.06 0.68 0.019 0.103 0.241 
BRA 0.49 0.14 0.34 0.47 0.67 0.0116 0.0165 0.53 0.121 0.44 55.17 11.64 10.67 0.67 0.73 0.025 0.133 0.512 
VEN 0.21 0.01 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.0007 0.0230 0.05 0.007 0.39 22.19 11.99 4.30 0.72 0.63 0.040 0.238 0.422 
IDN 0.43 0.13 0.20 0.39 0.37 0.0081 0.0064 0.28 0.018 0.23 16.06 9.05 13.62 0.56 0.60 0.017 0.125 0.561 
IRN 0.34 0.10 0.35 0.32 0.27 0.0009 0.0096 0.16   14.13   0.83 0.36 0.040 0.250 0.824 
Dendrogram A 
 
Dendrogram for cluster analysis without IVs 
 
 
   SLV        27   ─┐ 
  LKA        91   ─┤ 
  KEN        50   ─┤ 
  POL        80   ─┤ 
  MKD        58   ─┤ 
  LTU        56   ─┤ 
  PHL        79   ─┤ 
  BGR        13   ─┤ 
  PAK        74   ─┤ 
  LVA        54   ─┤ 
  HRV        22   ─┤ 
  CZE        23   ─┼─┐ 
  SVK        88   ─┤ │ 
  HND        39   ─┤ │ 
  IDN        42   ─┤ │ 
  BOL        10   ─┘ │ 
  ALB         1   ───┤ 
  DOM        25   ─┐ │ 
  PRY        77   ─┼─┤ 
  GTM        37   ─┘ │ 
  NGA        71   ─┐ │ 
  VEN       103   ─┤ │ 
  COL        19   ─┤ │ 
  TZA        96   ─┼─┼─┐ 
  CRI        21   ─┤ │ │ 
  RUS        83   ─┘ │ │ 
  PER        78   ─┐ │ │ 
  ROM        82   ─┼─┤ │ 
  COG        20   ─┤ │ │ 
  RWA        84   ─┤ │ │ 
  ARM         3   ─┘ │ │ 
  GEO        34   ─┐ │ │ 
  MRT        62   ─┤ │ │ 
  KGZ        52   ─┤ │ │ 
  MNG        65   ─┼─┘ │ 
  TCD        17   ─┤   │ 
  LSO        55   ─┤   │ 
  SWZ        92   ─┘   │ 
  BHR         6   ─┬─┐ │ 
  QAT        81   ─┘ ├─┤ 
  PNG        76   ─┐ │ │ 
  TTO        98   ─┼─┘ │ 
  EST        28   ─┤   │ 
  OMN        73   ─┘   │ 
  BHS         5   ─┬─┐ │ 
  VNM       104   ─┘ │ │ 
  IND        41   ─┐ │ ├─┐ 
  NPL        68   ─┼─┤ │ │ 
  BGD         7   ─┘ ├─┤ │ 
  PAN        75   ───┤ │ │ 
  MUS        63   ───┘ │ │ 
  CMR        15   ─┐   │ │ 
  YEM       105   ─┤   │ │ 
  GAB        32   ─┤   │ │ 
  MDG        59   ─┼─┐ │ │ 
  MDA        64   ─┤ │ │ │ 
  IRN        43   ─┘ ├─┤ ├───┐ 
  UGA        99   ───┤ │ │   │ 
  BWA        11   ───┘ │ │   │ 
  BDI        14   ─┐   │ │   │ 
  MMR        67   ─┼─┐ │ │   │ 
  HTI        38   ─┘ │ │ │   │ 
  JAM        47   ───┼─┘ │   ├─┐ 
  ETH        29   ───┘   │   │ │ 
  LAO        53   ─┬─┐   │   │ │ 
  MOZ        66   ─┘ ├───┤   │ │ 
  GMB        33   ───┘   │   │ │ 
  MWI        60   ───────┘   │ ├─┐ 
  ARG         2   ─────┬───┐ │ │ │ 
  URY       102   ─────┘   ├─┘ │ │ 
  BRA        12   ─────────┘   │ │ 
  SLE        86   ───┬───────┐ │ │ 
  ZMB       106   ───┘       ├─┘ │ 
  SYC        85   ───────┬───┘   │ 
  SYR        95   ───────┘       │ 
  FRA        31   ─┬─┐           │ 
  ITA        46   ─┘ │           │ 
  CHL        18   ─┬─┤           │ 
  KOR        51   ─┘ │           │ 
  BRB         8   ─┐ ├─┐         │ 
  BEL         9   ─┼─┤ │         │ 
  AUS         4   ─┤ │ │         │ 
  ISR        45   ─┤ │ │         │ 
  GRC        36   ─┘ │ ├─┐       │ 
  NOR        72   ─┐ │ │ │       ├─────────────────────────┐ 
  SWE        93   ─┼─┘ │ │       │                         │ 
  FIN        30   ─┘   │ │       │                         │ 
  DNK        24   ─┬───┤ ├─┐     │                         │ 
  ISL        40   ─┘   │ │ │     │                         │ 
  ZAF        89   ─────┘ │ │     │                         │ 
  JOR        49   ─┬───┐ │ │     │                         │ 
  SGP        87   ─┘   │ │ │     │                         │ 
  DEU        35   ─┬─┐ ├─┘ │     │                         │ 
  ESP        90   ─┘ ├─┤   ├─┐   │                         │ 
  CAN        16   ─┐ │ │   │ │   │                         ├───────┐ 
  GBR       100   ─┼─┘ │   │ │   │                         │       │ 
  NLD        69   ─┘   │   │ │   │                         │       │ 
  IRL        44   ───┬─┘   │ │   │                         │       │ 
  MYS        61   ───┘     │ ├─┐ │                         │       │ 
  USA       101   ─────────┘ │ │ │                         │       │ 
  THA        97   ───────────┤ │ │                         │       │ 
  MAC        57   ───────────┘ ├─┘                         │       │ 
  CHE        94   ─────────────┤                           │       │ 
  NZL        70   ─────────────┘                           │       │ 
  JPN        48   ─────────────────────────────────────────┘       │ 
  ECU        26   ─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
 Dendrogram B 
Dendrogram for cluster analysis with IVs 
 
   
  SLV        26   ─┬─┐ 
  LTU        55   ─┘ ├───┐ 
  MKD        56   ───┘   ├─┐ 
  ARM         3   ─────┬─┘ │ 
  PER        75   ─────┘   ├─┐ 
  CZE        22   ─────┬─┐ │ │ 
  SVK        84   ─────┘ │ │ │ 
  LVA        53   ───┬─┐ ├─┘ │ 
  POL        77   ───┘ ├─┤   │ 
  KEN        49   ─────┘ │   ├─┐ 
  TTO        94   ───────┘   │ │ 
  PHL        76   ─┬───┐     │ │ 
  LKA        87   ─┘   ├─┐   │ │ 
  PAK        71   ─────┘ ├─┐ │ │ 
  GTM        36   ───────┘ │ │ │ 
  HRV        21   ─────────┼─┘ │ 
  BOL         9   ─────────┘   ├─┐ 
  BGR        12   ─────────┬───┤ │ 
  COL        18   ─────────┘   │ │ 
  CRI        20   ───┬─────┐   │ │ 
  HND        38   ───┘     ├───┘ ├─┐ 
  SWZ        88   ─────────┘     │ │ 
  DOM        24   ───┬─────┐     │ │ 
  PRY        74   ───┘     ├─┐   │ │ 
  MOZ        64   ─────────┘ ├───┤ │ 
  ARG         2   ───────────┘   │ │ 
  ROM        79   ───────────────┘ │ 
  OMN        70   ─────┬───┐       │ 
  QAT        78   ─────┘   ├───┐   │ 
  VNM       100   ─────────┘   │   ├─┐ 
  COG        19   ───┬─────────┼─┐ │ │ 
  RWA        81   ───┘         │ │ │ │ 
  LSO        54   ─────┬─────┐ │ │ │ │ 
  PNG        73   ─────┘     │ │ │ │ │ 
  GEO        33   ─────┐     ├─┘ │ │ │ 
  MNG        63   ─────┼───┐ │   │ │ │ 
  KGZ        51   ─────┘   │ │   │ │ │ 
  CMR        14   ─────┬─┐ ├─┘   │ │ │ 
  MDG        57   ─────┘ │ │     ├─┘ │ 
  TCD        16   ─┬───┐ ├─┘     │   │ 
  MRT        60   ─┘   ├─┤       │   │ 
  GAB        31   ─────┘ │       │   │ 
  YEM       101   ───────┘       │   │ 
  ALB         1   ─────────┬───┐ │   │ 
  JAM        46   ─────────┘   ├─┤   │ 
  GMB        32   ─────────────┘ │   │ 
  BGD         7   ───┐           │   │ 
  NPL        65   ───┼─────────┐ │   │ 
  IND        40   ───┘         │ │   ├─┐ 
  MDA        62   ─────┬─┐     ├─┘   │ │ 
  NGA        68   ─────┘ ├───┐ │     │ │ 
  TZA        92   ───────┘   ├─┘     │ │ 
  UGA        95   ───────────┘       │ │ 
  BWA        10   ───────────────────┤ │ 
  RUS        80   ───────────┬───┐   │ ├─┐ 
  VEN        99   ───────────┘   ├───┘ │ │ 
  IDN        41   ─────────────┬─┘     │ │ 
  IRN        42   ─────────────┘       │ │ 
  BDI        13   ─────┬─────┐         │ │ 
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  HTI        37   ─────┘     │         │ │ 
  ETH        28   ───────────┼───┐     │ │ 
  SLE        82   ───────────┘   ├─────┘ ├───┐ 
  SYR        91   ───────────────┘       │   │ 
  LAO        52   ─────────────────┬─────┤   │ 
  MWI        58   ─────────────────┘     │   │ 
  BRA        11   ───────────────┬───────┘   │ 
  URY        98   ───────────────┘           │ 
  BHS         5   ─────────────┬───┐         │ 
  MUS        61   ─────────────┘   │         │ 
  PAN        72   ─────────────────┤         │ 
  GRC        35   ─────────────┬───┤         │ 
  JOR        48   ─────────────┘   ├─┐       │ 
  BEL         8   ─────┬─┐         │ │       │ 
  ISR        44   ─────┘ ├───┐     │ │       │ 
  AUS         4   ───────┘   ├─┐   │ │       │ 
  CHL        17   ─────┬─┐   │ │   │ │       │ 
  ITA        45   ─────┘ ├───┘ │   │ │       ├─────┐ 
  FRA        30   ─────┬─┘     │   │ │       │     │ 
  KOR        50   ─────┘       │   │ │       │     │ 
  DNK        23   ───────┬───┐ │   │ │       │     │ 
  ISL        39   ───────┘   │ │   │ │       │     │ 
  FIN        29   ───┬───┐   ├─┼───┘ ├───┐   │     │ 
  SWE        89   ───┘   │   │ │     │   │   │     │ 
  NOR        69   ───────┼─┐ │ │     │   │   │     │ 
  EST        27   ───────┘ ├─┘ │     │   │   │     │ 
  BHR         6   ─────────┘   │     │   │   │     │ 
  ZAF        85   ─────────────┘     │   │   │     │ 
  MYS        59   ─────────────┬─┐   │   │   │     ├─────────┐ 
  SGP        83   ─────────────┘ │   │   ├─┐ │     │         │ 
  CAN        15   ───┬───────┐   ├───┤   │ │ │     │         │ 
  GBR        96   ───┘       ├───┤   │   │ │ │     │         │ 
  DEU        34   ─────┬───┐ │   │   │   │ │ │     │         │ 
  ESP        86   ─────┘   ├─┘   │   │   │ ├─┘     │         │ 
  NLD        66   ─────────┘     │   │   │ │       │         ├─────┐ 
  IRL        43   ───────────────┘   │   │ │       │         │     │ 
  USA        97   ───────────────────┘   │ │       │         │     │ 
  THA        93   ───────────────────────┘ │       │         │     │ 
  NZL        67   ─────────────────────────┘       │         │     │ 
  ZMB       102   ─────────────────────────────────┘         │     │ 
  JPN        47   ───────────────────────────────┬───────────┘     │ 
  CHE        90   ───────────────────────────────┘                 │ 
  ECU        25   ─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
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